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COPYRIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Pamela Samuelson*
I. THE MODERN VIEW OF COPYRIGHT AND FREE EXPRESSION
Copyright and freedom of expression have often been viewed as harmonious
and complementary concepts. In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enteprises,
for example, the Supreme Court characterized copyright law as the "engine of free
expression."' To hold a left-leaning news magazine liable for copyright
infringement for publishing excerpts from Gerald Ford's forthcoming memoirs
was not, in the Court's view, to condone an act of private censorship. It was
consistent with First Amendment principles because copyright incentives would
ensure that what Ford had to say about the Nixon pardon in his memoirs would
reach the public through the normal operation of the marketplace.2 Copyright
furthers democratic discourse by providing rights that enable independent writers
and artists to make a living from their expression.3 L. Ray Patterson is among the
scholars whose work explores copyright's important contributions to freedom of
expression in the modem era.
4
* Chancellor's Professor of Information Management & Law, University of California at
Berkeley. Earlier versions of this Articlewere presented at a Yale Law School symposium on Private
Censorship, April 9-11, 1999, and at a conference on the Commodification of Information held at
Haifa University in May of 1999. An earlier version was also published in COMMODIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Netanel, eds., 2002) under the title "Copyright,
Commodification, and Censorship: Past as Prologue-But to What Future?" The work of L Ray
Patterson, to whom this Symposium is dedicated, heavily influenced this Article in all of its
manifestations. The title of this Article echoes that of Patterson's excellent book COPYRIGHT IN
HISTORICALPERSPECTIVE (1968). The author wishes to thankJames Boyle, Niva Elkin-Koren, and
Neil Netanel for their encouragement and Eddan Katz for his valuable research assistance. Research
support for this Article was provided by NSF Grant No. SES 9979852.
1 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
2 Two principal facts that cut against the fair use defense were, first, that The Nation attempted
to "scoop" publication of Ford's memoirs by publishing excerpts about the Nixon pardon and,
second, that the manuscript from which the Nation's editors drew these excerpts was allegedly
"purloined." Id at 562-64.
- See, e.g., Neil W. Netanel, Copyright anda Democratic CivilSociey, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996); Niva
Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyight Law in Cberspace, 14
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215 (1996).
SSee L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987). See also
sources cited infra notes 5-17.
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In the mainstream view, harmony between copyright and the First Amend-
ment exists because copyright protection extends only to an author's "expres-
sion," not to the "ideas" or information the work may contain.' Other authors
are always free to express the same ideas or reuse information derived from a
protected work in a subsequent work as long as he or she expresses the ideas or
information in a different way.6 This principle substantially limits the potential
for private censorship in copyright.
Fair use has been a second copyright doctrine contributing to the compatibility
of copyright and the First Amendment.7 For example, when secretive billionaire
Howard Hughes acquired the copyright in a magazine article about his life and
tried to use the copyright to stop publication of an unauthorized biography, an
appellate court rebuffed the effort to use this copyright to accomplish an act of
private censorship by finding that the biographer had made fair use of the article.'
Similarly, Acuff-Rose Music, copyright owner of the popular song "Pretty
Woman," tried to stop a rap music group, Two Live Crew, from selling a rap
parody version of this song. The Supreme Court viewed the parody as an
exemplification of critical commentary that the fair use doctrine should permit.9
In these and other cases, courts have invoked fair use to prevent the exercise of
copyright as a means of censoring content of which the copyright owner
disapproved."0
Fair use and the idea/expression distinction have sometimes failed to preserve
as much harmony between copyright and free expression principles as society
deems desirable. In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's Harper &Row decision,
5 See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, Does CopyightAbridge the FirstAmendment Guarantee of Free Speech
andFree Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180,1186-89 (1970). Nimmer also regarded the limited duration
of copyright as important to the consistency of copyright and the first amendment. Id at 1193.
6 The idea/expression "merger" doctrine also accommodates First Amendment principles.
When there is effectively only one or a small number of ways of expressing an idea, courts are likely
to view the "idea" in a work as having "merged" with its "expression," precluding copyright
protection for the expression in order not to protect the work's ideas. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Proctor
& Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) (granting summary judgment because of the limited
number of ways to express sweepstakes rules).
7 See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 983, 1011-15,
1017-22 (1970); Patterson, supra note 4, at 36-48. See alro Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free
Speech: ConrtitutionalL 'mitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REv. 283 (1979). For a recent
affirmation of the importance of the fair use doctrine in harmonizing copyright with First
Amendment principles, see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
See Rosemont Enter. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
9 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
10 See also National Rifle Ass'n v. Handgun Control Fed'n of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 1994)
(holding that it was fair use to reproduce list of Ohio legislators and address information compiled
by the NRA); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that it was fair
use to copy text from pro-abortion book to book critical of abortion).
[Vol. 10:319
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for example, some courts expressed doubt that the fair use defense could be
invoked as to unpublished works." Biographers and historians perceived
themselves to be at risk of private censorship if they quoted from unpublished
letters or manuscripts of public figures, such as those by the famously privateJ.D.
Salinger or the controversial founder of the Scientology movement. 2 Congress
responded to these concerns by amending the fair use provision to clarify that the
unpublished works could raise fair use as a defense." Thus, a seeming rift
between copyright and freedom of expression principles was mended, and
historians and biographers, among others, breathed a sigh of relief.'4
On other occasions, conflicts between copyright and First Amendment
principles have been resolved through the common law adjudication process.
Some years ago, for example, there was reason to be concerned about free
expression in the computer programming field after several courts endorsed the
"total concept and feel" test for determining software copyright infringement. A
serious problem with this test was its considerable vagueness. Computer
programmers seemed at risk if they developed programs that functioned
similarly.'5 When subsequent cases repudiated "look and feel" theories of
infringement, 6 this conflict between copyright and freedom of expression
principles was resolved without the need for Congressional action.
This pattern of copyright doctrines and developments seems to have bred
complacency among some copyright professionals about the compatibility of
copyright and freedom of expression principles. 7 The overwhelming majority of
it See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting from author's
unpublished letters held not fair use); New Era Pubs. Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990) (quoting from unpublished text held unfair use of
copyrighted work).
12 See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, TowardaFair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990) (discussing
cases).
13 See 17 U.S.C. § 107, as amended. For an informative discussion of the legislative history of
this amendment, see, e.g.,Jessica Litman, CopjyightandInformation Pofig, 55 LAw& CONTEMP. PROBS.
185 (1992).
14 Yet concerns persist about chilling effects on free expression of visual artists from rulings
such as Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aft'd, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 934 (1992). See, e.g., Louise Harmon, Law, Art, and the KilingJar, 79 IOWA L. REV. 367
(1994).
15 See Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perrpective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright
ina Work's Total Concept andFeel', 38 EMoRYL.J. 393 (1989). The principal case endorsing the "look
and feel" concept was Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow DentalLab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
16 See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting
"look and feel" claim for user interface); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st
Cir. 1995), afd by equal# divided court, 506 U.S. 233 (1996) (rejecting "look and feel" claim).
17 Of greater concern is the complacency that it has bred in the courts. See, e.g., Eldred v.
2003]
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commentary about copyright and the First Amendment has been produced by
copyright scholars whose acculturation to copyright doctrines may have blinded
them from perceiving threats to free expression values that First Amendment
scholars might readily perceive. Unfortunately, First Amendment scholars have,
until very recently, virtually ignored the implications of copyright for free speech
and free expression principles."5
Shaking off the copyright field's complacency is a new generation of
scholars-including Yochai Benkler, Julie Cohen, Niva Elkin-Koren, Mark
Lemley, Lawrence Lessig, Neil Netanel, and Eugene Volokh-who recognize a
greater potential for disharmony between copyright and freedom of expression
principles than their predecessors.19  These scholars have recognized that
expansions in the scope of rights that copyright owners enjoy and contractions
of fair use rights and other limitations on copyright create the potential for more
conflicts between copyright and the First Amendment.' These young scholars
have invoked the First Amendment and other constitutional principles to shore
up limiting doctrines of copyright law and to make policy recommendations about
how copyright law should evolve.
2 1
As admirable as this new literature is, it largely ignores the fact that copyright
has at least as long a history of being indifferent or hostile to freedom of
expression values as it has a history of being the so-called "engine of free
expression."'  These young scholars would do well to revisit the work of L. Ray
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769,789-90 (2003) (idea/expression distinction and fair use "generally adequate"
to safeguard free speech interests).
Is But see Edwin C. Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copytight, 55 VANDERBILT L. REv. 891
(2002); Jed Ruben feld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionaliy, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002).
See also Brief of Jack M. Balkin, Yochai Benkler, Burt Neuborne, Robert Post, and Jed Ruben feld as
Amici Curiae to the U.S. Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at http://eldred.cc/legal/
supremecourt.html.
19 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, FreeAs theAirto Common Use: FirstAmendment Constraints on Enclosure
ofthe Pubic Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354 (1999); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to ReadAnonymous : A
Closer Look at Copyright Management in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 981 (1996); Niva Elkin-Koren,
Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Care Against Copyright Liabik!'y of
Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345 (1995); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Propeny Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1999);
LAWRENCE LESsIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (2000); Neil W. Netanel, Locating
CoPyight Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
20 See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 19, at 12-13 (discussing expansions in copyright and contraction
of limitations on copyright as a reason for greater potential conflicts between copyright and the First
Amendment).
21 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 19, at 1003-19 (arguing for a First Amendment-based interest in
a right to read anonymously); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 19, at 210-15 (arguing that the First
Amendment should limit the use of preliminary injunctions in copyright cases).
22 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. For a history of the pre-modem era of copyright, see,
[Vol. 10:319
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Patterson, which explicates the historical role of copyright as a means of
suppressing, rather than promoting, freedom of expression and speech. 2
Understanding this history may be helpful in assessing whether copyright's early
history may be a prologue to a future in which copyright will once again be at
odds with freedom of speech and expression principles.
II. FROM THE PRE-MODERN To THE MODERN ERA OF COPYRIGHT
The first copyright era-which I will term its "pre-modem" phase--arose out
of practices and policies of the English Stationers' Guild in the late 15th and early
16th centuries.24 To ensure harmony within the ranks, the guild established a
registry system for staking claims in books.2" Members could enter in the guild's
register the names of books in which they claimed printing rights,2 6 whereupon
other guild members were expected to refrain from publishing the same book.
A private enforcement system enabled guild members to resolve disputes amongst
themselves over rights in particular books.27 While some printers in this era were
surely noble fellows who sought to enlighten the public, the private copyright
system of the pre-modem era mainly functioned to regulate the book trade to
ensure that members of the guild enjoyed monopolies in the books they printed.6
The Stationers' copyright system was conducive to taking on a second
function. Conveniently for English authorities, the guild's practices provided an
infrastructure for controlling (i.e., suppressing) publication of heretical and
seditious materials. English kings and queens were quite willing to grant to the
Stationers' Guild control over the publication of books in the realm in exchange
for the guild's promise to refrain from printing such dangerous materials?9 Until
e.g., L. RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968). See aLto MARK ROSE,
AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1 993);JOHN FEATHER, A HISTORY OF
BRITISH PUBLISHING (1988).
23 See, e.g., PATrERSON, supra note 22, at 114-42.
24 See, e.g., id at 28-77. The guild included not only the printers of books, but others involved
in the book trade, such as book-binders and booksellers. English kings and queens also granted
letters patent to certain printers conferring on them exclusive rights to print certain types of works,
but this was an auxiliary system of regulating the printing trade that in time was folded into
copyright.
2' I1 at 51-64.
Id at 51-53. Rights to print these books were regarded by guild members as perpetual in
duration; they could, however, be assigned or licensed to other guild members. Id at 47-48.
" Id at 57-59.
28 Id at 43-45.
29 That the Licensing Acts were integrally interrelated with the Stationers' copyright system is
demonstrated in part by the fact that the Stationers Company emphasized the valuable role of these
acts in suppressing dangerous speech when arguing that Parliament should reinstate the Licensing
2003]
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its abolition, the Star Chamber was available to enforce judgments emanating
from the stationers' private adjudication system and to stop publication of
seditious and heretical materials.3"
The pre-modern copyright system undoubtedly promoted freedom of
expression in some respects by making books more widely available. However,
this was an incidental byproduct of the market for books, not an intended
purpose of the then-prevailing copyright system. Far more harmonious in that
era was the relationship between copyright and censorship. Men burned at the
stake for writing texts that were critical of the Crown or of established religion,
and printers of such books could expect no better fate. The stationers' copyright
regime was part of the apparatus aimed at ensuring that these texts would not be
printed or otherwise be made widely accessible to the public.3
Over time, discontent arose about the pre-modem copyright system, both
because of its monopolistic character and because of its role in censorship. 2 The
principal development that ushered in the modem era of copyright was the
English Parliament's passage of the Statute of Anne in 1710."3 On its face, this
statute was both a repudiation of several tenets of the Stationers' copyright system
and a redirection of copyright's purpose away from censorship and toward
freedom of expression principles.34 It also sought to promote competition among
printers and booksellers-that is, to break the stranglehold that major firms
within the Stationers' Company had had over the book trade. 5
The Statute of Anne achieved these goals in several ways. First, the act
granted rights to authors, not to publishers.36 Second, it did so for the utilitarian
purpose of inducing learned men to write and publish books.37 Third, the act
established a larger societal purpose for copyright, namely, to promote learning.3"
Fourth, it granted rights only in newly authored books.3 Thereafter, ancient
books were in the public domain and could be printed by anyonei ° Fifth, it
limited the duration of copyright protection to fourteen years, which was
Acts after they expired in the late 17th century. See id at 141-42.
30 PArTERSON, supra note 22, at 115-26.
1' Id at 128.
32 See, e.g., John Milton, Areopigatica (1643); PATrERSON, supra note 22, at 7.
3 Id at 143-50.
34 Id at 151.
3s Id at 143.
36 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (1790) (Eng.).
38 Id
31 See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 148-49.
' Id Rose discusses at length the efforts of major London booksellers to maintain their
monopoly, even after the Statute of Anne. This effort was ultimately unsuccessful after the House
of Lords rejected their claim in Donalson v. Beckett. See ROSE, supra note 22, at 67-91.
[Vol. 10:319
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renewable for another fourteen years if the author was living at the end of that
term, thus abolishing perpetual copyrights.4 Sixth, the statute conferred rights
of a limited character-not to control all uses of protected works, but only the
printing and reprinting of them.42 Seventh, it imposed a responsibility on
publishers to deposit copies of their works with designated libraries.43 Eighth, it
provided a system for redressing grievances about overpriced books."
Although it took nearly fifty years for the pre-modem copyright system finally
to die away,4" the modem law of copyright emerged from the Statute of Anne's
precepts. Censorship held no place of honor in this new copyright system.
Instead, the modern copyright regime established by the Statute of Anne
embraced Enlightenment values.46 These same values influenced the framers of
the U.S. Constitution. 7 Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution
empowers Congress to promote the progress of science and the useful arts by
securing to authors and inventors for limited times an exclusive right in their
respective writings and discoveries. This clause should be viewed in historical
context as an American endorsement of England's repudiation of the speech-
suppressing, anti-competitive and otherwise repressive pre-modem copyright
system that the English Parliament meant to reshape through the Statute of
Anne.4" Core elements of the Statute of Anne are reflected in that clause's
purpose ("to promote Science"), in the persons to whom rights were to be
granted ("authors"), and in the duration of rights ("for limited times").
Copyright scholar Marci Hamilton has sometimes asserted that the Constitu-
tion did not include a provision on freedom of speech because the framers had
done everything necessary to ensure a healthy system of free expression by
authorizing enactment of a copyright law.49 Though I would not go that far, I
" A "grandfather" provision allowed holders of existing copyrights an additional period within
which to exploit their traditional rights, but the duration was limited. PATTERSON, supra note 22,
at 147-48.
42 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (1790) (Eng.).
43 d 5 V.
- Id 5 IV.
41 See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 22, at 71-91 (discussing litigation about the implications of the
Statute of Anne for common law rights).
4 See, e.g., Paul Edward Geller, Copyright History andFuture." What's Culture Got to Do With It?, 47
J. Cop. OFF. Soc'Y U.S.A. 209, 256-57 (2000); Shubha Ghosh, Enkghtening Idenlity and Copyrght, 49
BUFFALO L. REV. 1315, 1335 (2001); ROSE, supra note 22, at 44-46.
4 See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGYASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 37-39 (1986).
41 See, e.g., Edward C. Walterscheid, The Nature ofthe IntellectualProperty Clause: A Study in Historical
Perspective (Part 1), 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 763, 769-71 (2001).
4' Address to the Section on Defamation and Privacy, Association of American Law Schools,
San Francisco CA, January 1998.
20031
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would agree that the copyright clause of the Constitution, properly construed,
embodies First Amendment and anti-monopoly principles.0 Because of this,
perhaps there is a "dormant copyright clause" waiting to be reawakened in the
case law-and hopefully also in Congress-after a long hibernation in which the
clause has become a meaningless clich&L
III. THE EMERGENCE OF POST-MODERN COPYRIGHT
Until very recently, U.S. copyright law has been true to the basic principles of
the Statute of Anne.52 In the modem era, the legislative grant of rights to authors
has been conceived as a means of achieving the societal goal of promoting
learning and public access to knowledge, rather than being the primary goal of the
copyright system. 3 Until the Copyright Act of 1976, the exclusive rights of
copyright were narrowly drawn.-" The 1976 Act broadened the grant of exclusive
rights, yet narrowed the scope of these rights through a series of public interest
exceptions, including fair use.55 For the most part, the law of copyright has
regulated public and commercial uses of copyrighted works, not private and
noncommercial uses. 6
The principal impetus for change in U.S. copyright policy-away from the
modem conception to what I will call the post-modem conception of
copyright-would seem to be the great success of U.S. copyright industries.
Copyright industries now account for over five percent of the U.S. gross domestic
product.5 7  They are, moreover, major exporters of products and services,
contributing favorably to what is otherwise a huge imbalance in U.S. trade with
other nations."8 The success of U.S. copyright industries has made Congress quite
receptive to arguments for stronger and longer legal protection. 9
o See aLro Goldstein, supra note 7, at 986-88.
s' See Marci Hamilton, The Dormant Cop yight Clause (manuscript on file with the author).
5' See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,429,220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
665 (1984).
s3 See, e.g., id
s4 See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 35-63, 37 (2001) (describing the political
processes and compromises leading up to the adopting of the 1976 act).
ss 17 U.S.C. § 106-122 (2002). Section 106 contains the grant of exclusive rights and sections
107-121 are the public interest limitations of those rights. Id
' See, e.g.,Jessica Litman, Rtvising Copyrigbt Law for the Information Age, 75 OREGON L. REV. 19,
40-43 (1996); Patterson, supra note 4, at 41-48.
57 See, e.g., Stephen E. Siwek, Copyvngbt Indsstries in the U.S. Economy: The 2002 Report at 3, availabe
at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2002_SIWEK-FULL.pdf.
58 See, e.g., id at 17-18.
s9 See, e.g., LITMAN, supra note 54, at 62.
[Vol. 10:319
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A second, but nonetheless important, impetus for change in U.S. copyright
policy would seem to be the daunting challenges that copyright industries face
from advances in information technology and the emergence of global digital
networks that have made it easier and cheaper than ever before to make multiple
copies of copyrighted works and widely distribute them (e.g., through peer-to-peer
networking software).' The post-modem vision of copyright was set forth at
length in the Clinton Administration's 1995 "White Paper" on "Intellectual
Property and the National Information Infrastructure," which recommended
stronger legal protections for copyright owners to enable new markets for
copyrighted works in the digital networked environment."
There are some disturbing parallels between the pre-modem copyright system
and post-modem developments.
A. CONCENTRATION IN THE COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES
The Stationers' Company was dominated by a small number of London
booksellers who had considerable control over the dissemination of informational
works in the pre-modem copyright era.6" In the waning decades of the twentieth
century, there has been a pronounced trend toward increasing concentration
among the major copyright industry players, especially in the publishing (e.g., Reed
Elsevier) and entertainment markets (e.g., AOL-Time-Wamer and Disney). Major
copyright industry players have been remarkably successful in recent years in
promoting a copyright maximalist agenda in the national policy arena, as though
theirs were the only interests worthy of concern.63 This should be of concern in
part because strengthening intellectual property rights does not uniformly advance
the interests of all creators. The advantages of ever stronger copyright rules
accrue mainly to large vertically integrated content providers while disadvantaging
small scale firms and individual creators.' Consolidation in the copyright
industries also impedes the efforts of free-lance writers to negotiate fair contracts
with major media firms who want writers to assign all rights in their works for a
one-time payment.6
60 See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 31-32, 38-39 (1999) [hereinafter DIGITAL DILEMMA].
61 See, e.g., Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property, Intellectual Property and the
National Information Infrastructure 63-84 (Sept. 1995) [hereinafter White Paper] (recommending
stronger legal protection for copyright owners).
62 See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 30-36.
63 See, e.g., James Boyle, The Politics of Intelkctual Propery: Entironmenta'sm for the Net?, 47 DUKE
L.J. 87 (1997).
64 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 19, at 400-08.
65 See, e.g., P. Bernt Hugenholtz, The Grat Copyright Robbey: Rights Allocation in a Digital
2003]
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B. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION, RATHERTHAN LEARNING, BECOMES THE DOMINANT
VALUE
In the pre-modern era, the purpose of the Stationers' copyright regime was to
maintain monopolies in their "copies" and thereby to maximize the profits of
member firms. During the modem era, the purpose of copyright was to promote
learning, and the rights copyright conferred were correspondingly limited."
During the modem era, the utilitarian rationale for copyright predominated: the
goal of copyright law was to provide enough rights to provide adequate incentives
to induce creators to innovate-but not more than this67
Today, however, dominant firms in the copyright industries act as though the
purpose of copyright law is and should be to maximize revenues for the benefit
of rights holders,68 not to provide just enough protection to create incentives for
investments in creative endeavors. 69 Hollywood motion picture studios may have
recouped investments in films many times over, but they nevertheless wish to
exploit whatever residual value exists in those films. That the utilitarian rationale
for granting authors limited rights in their works has given way to pure rent-
seeking behavior by dominant industry players is plainly illustrated by the
Congressional decision in 1998 to extend the copyright term of existing works for
another twenty years.70
Environment, presented at New York University Law School (Apr. 2000), awilable athttp://www.ivir.
nl/medewerkers/hugenholtz-uk.html.
See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 4, at 35.
67 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant copyrights and patents is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance the public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in science and useful arts."). See Thomas Macaulay, Speech Before the
House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), 8 THE WORKS OF LORD MACAuLAY 203-04 (Lady Trevelyan,
1906) ("But the evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the
good.").
68 See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 19, at 27-28.
69 Postmodern scholar Jean-Francois Lyotard observed more than two decades ago that
knowledge was increasingly becoming a commodity and ceasing to be an end in itself. See JEAN-
FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 4-6 (Geoff
Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., University of Minnesota Press 1984).
70 See, e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1998)) [hereinafter CTEA]. The Supreme Court recently rejected
a constitutional challenge to the extension of terms of existing copyrights, notwithstanding the
submission of a brief amicus curiae of seventeen prominent economists, including three Nobel Prize
winners, demonstrating that CTEA is economically unjustifiable. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct.
769, 804 (2003) (Breyer dissent explaining the economic irrationality of CTEA). See also Dennis S.
KafjalaJudicialRetiew of Copyright Term Extension Legislation, 36 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 199,242 (2002)
(stating "rent seeking activity by special interests would not result in monopolies impending advances
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C. EXCESSIVE PRICING
In the post-modem era, as in the pre-modem era, complaints about excessive
pricing of copyrighted works have become common. Universities have, for
example, been vocal about excessive pricing of science, technical, and medical
journals sold by publishing giants such as Reed Elsevier.7 Charged with price-
fixing of CDs of sound recordings, major firms within the recording industry
agreed to settle the matter through issuance of vouchers to overcharged
customers." Pricing one's products clearlyis, of course, consistent with the profit
maximization strategy favored by major copyright industry firms and an expected
result of concentration in the major copyright industry markets. Fewer concerns
about excessive pricing occurred in the modem era when a larger number of
industry players were engaged in more competition amongst themselves.
One way to respond to problems posed by excessive pricing and other market
failures is compulsory licensing. Noticeably absent from public discourse about
intellectual property in the U.S. in recent years is any serious consideration of the
possibility of imposing compulsory licenses, legal licenses, or obligations to
license on fair and reasonable terms as a way to counteract this problem, although
some scholars have raised these as possibilities.
73
D. PERPETUAL COPYRIGHiS
In the pre-modem era, copyrights were perpetual. In the modem era,
copyrights were limited in duration-long enough to enable authors to benefit
from the commercial value (if any) deriving from their work, but enriching the
public domain thereafter. 74 In the post-modern era, Congress extended the terms
of copyrights in existing works so that early Mickey Mouse movies and other
commercially valuable works from the 1920's and 1930's would not enter the
public domain. This suggests that copyright in the post-modem era may be on
in and dissemination of knowledge").
71 See, e.g., Stanley Chodorow & Peter Lyman, The Future of Scholary Communication, in THE
MIRAGE OF CONTINUITY (Brian Hawkins & Patricia Battin, eds. 1998).
"2 See, e.g., Benny Evangelista, Consumers Rush to join CD Settlement, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 27,
2003.
" See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privatey Legislated Inelkctual Propeily Rights:
Reco~cilng Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875 (1999). See
also Netanel, supra note 19, at 84 (stating that the Supreme Court suggested the issuance of a
compulsory license to further the public interest).
"' See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, Goodbye to All That-A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adeu to aConstitutional -Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copynght Law, 29 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595,
597-600 (1996).
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its way to becoming perpetual again-this time on the installment plan, as Peter
Jaszi so wittily observed." The Supreme Court decided not to second-guess the
wisdom of copyright term extension in its Eldred v. Arbcroft decision which
affirmed the power of Congress to extend copyright terms for existing works, as
long as the extended term is not unlimited in duration.76
The public domain is threatened not just by copyright term extensions, but
also by the use of digital rights management (DRM) technologies to protect works
whose copyrights will expire in coming years. Technical measures will not cease
limiting access and use when the copyright expires (assuming no further
extensions). DRM technologies are, moreover, being used to control access to
and uses of public domain works.77 This means that works that copyright law
officially regards as in the public domain may be perpetually protected by
technology, backed up by anti-circumvention rules (discussed below) as long as
rights holders use the same technical measures to protect works in copyright as
well as works out of copyright.
7 8
E. THE SUBSIDENCE OF TIE AUTHOR AND THE RISE OF THE WORK
The U.S. Constitution, like the Statute of Anne, identifies "authors" as the
persons to whom exclusive rights may be granted to promote the progress of
science. 79 In the modem era, authors were valued participants in the knowledge-
generation process that copyright was designed to promote. Authors benefited
not only from the exclusive rights that allowed them to control commercial
exploitations of their works, but also from limiting principles, such as fair use,
which allow authors to build on their predecessors' works.
As in the pre-modem era, the post-modem copyright emphasis is on "the
work," "the copyright," and "the rights holder," rather than on the "author."'
The post-modem copyright system promotes the interests of rights holders far
more than it promotes the interests of individual authors. The major labels in the
7s The Copyrght Term Extenion Act of 1995: Heang on S. 4839 Before the Senate Judidag Comm.,
104th Cong. 1st Sess. (1995) (testimony of Professor Peter Jaszi).
7"6 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
' See, e.g., Submission of the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge to the
Copyright Office Rulemaking Concerning Anti-Circumvention Rules, available at http://www.
copyright.gov/1201/2003/comrnments/index.html.
78 See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. Development of a technology to bypass a
technical measure used to protect a public domain work is illegal under these rules as long as
copyright owners use the same technical measure to protect works in copyright. See 17 U.S.C. §
1201(a)(2) and (b)(1).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8.
go See Peter Jaszi, Toward a Copyn'ght Theor: The Metamorphoses ofAuthorsho, 1991 DuKE L.J. 455
(1991).
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recording industry have, for example, systematically advanced their interests in a
way that has worked to the disadvantage of many individual performers, including
by seeking legislation to designate sound recordings as "works for hire" so that
individual creators would not be able to exercise statutory termination of transfer
rights."' The motion picture industry has so far fended off efforts by directors,
cinematographers, and screenplay writers (co-authors of motion pictures) to gain
statutory protection for moral rights that should allow these authors to protect
the integrity of their creations, even though the United States would seem to be
obliged to protect these rights by its accession to the Berne Convention.
8 2
F. THE EXPANSION OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS AND THE EROSION OF FAIR USE AND
OTHER COPYRIGHTLIMITATIONS
The modem law of copyright granted authors a very limited set of legal rights.
Only authors of newly made maps, charts, and books qualified for exclusive
rights; the rights granted were to print, reprint, and vend these items for a
fourteen year term. 3 Over the past two centuries, the subject matter of copyright
has expanded, as has the scope of exclusive rights. Although most of the
exclusive rights of U.S. copyright law are limited to "public" acts-of distribution,
performance, and display-the most commonly invoked of the exclusive
rights-indeed, the one integrally bound up in the name of this law-the right to
reproduce the work in copies is not so limited.' Until very recently, however, it
was widely assumed that private and non-commercial copies were fair use or
otherwise beyond the power and authority of copyright owners to control.8"
Advances in digital technologies have made copies very easy and cheap to make;
more significantly, when works are in digital form, access to and use of the
information they contain requires making copies in the random access memory
of a computer." As a result, the copyright industries are increasingly seeking to
regulate private and noncommercial copying of copyrighted works and to insist
" See, e.g., Courtney Love, Courtng Love Does the Math, Salon Magazine, availabk at http://www.
salon.com/tech/feature/2000/06/14/love/; Shawn Zeller, Compromise, Hell.!, 32 NAT'LLAwJ. 3668
(2000) (discussing the recording industry's success in obtaining legislation naming sound recordings
as works for hire).
V See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 6bis, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1986).
83 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
" See 17 U.S.C. % 106(3)-106(5) (distribution, performance, and display rights); 106(1)
(reproduction right).
85 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (announcing a
presumption that private, noncommercial copying of copyrighted works was fair use). See also
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 60, at 123-36 (discussing private use copying of digital content).
l6 Id at 28, 31.
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that the reproduction right of copyright law gives them exclusive rights over all
access to and use of copyrighted works in digital form. 7
At the same time, fair use and other limiting principles of copyright law have
been under siege. In the modem era, the constitutional values of promoting the
progress of science and freedom of expression supported the recognition of fair
use and limiting principles of U.S. copyright law."8 For most of the modem era,
fair use and related limitations on the scope of copyright have been regarded as
part of the social bargain of the U.S. copyright system and necessary to achieving
the constitutional goal of promoting the progress of science." In the post-
modem era, however, fair use and other limitations have come to be perceived as
an unfair "tax" on rights holders.9 Some predict that fair use will fade away
because of new licensing schemes copyright owners are developing to control
access to and uses of their works.9 The 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) arguably limits the authority of
member states of the World Trade Organization to create exceptions and
limitations that interfere with the ability of rights holders to control exploitations
of their works.9 2 Some representatives of copyright industries have already
expressed a desire to use this agreement to challenge copyright exceptions in
national copyright laws,93 and at least one such exception-that exempting some
commercial establishments from royalty payments for some music perfor-
mances-has been successfully challenged as a violation of the TRIPs
Agreement.94
87 See, e.g., White Paper, supra note 61, at 64-66.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. % 107-121 (2000) (copyright exceptions).
89 See, e.g., Litman, supra note 56, at 31-35.
90 See, e.g., White Paper, supra note 61, at 84.
9' Id at 49-53, 82.
92 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter FINAL ACT]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1c, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33
l.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs].
" See, e.g., Eric Smith, Worldwide Copyight Protection Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 559, 577-78 (1996). But see Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. DigitalAgenda at IPO, 37
VA. J. INT'L L. 369, 398-409 (1997) (arguing that existing copyright exceptions and limitations are
compatible with TRIPs).
94 See, e.g., Laurence Heifer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: A Bernel TRIPS and Economic Anasis of
the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93 (2000) (reviewing the Fairness in Music
Licensing Act under the TRIPs Agreement).
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G. THE DECLINE OF ORIGINALITY AS A MEANINGFUL CONSTRAINT ON
PUBLISHER RIGHTS
In the pre-modem era, the availability of copyright protection did not depend
on any "originality" of expression in the works for which copyright was claimed.9"
In the modern era, works had to have a spark of creative "originality" in order to
qualify for copyright protection." The U.S. Supreme Court's 1991 Feist v. Rural
Telephone decision, reaffirms the modem conception of "originality" as a
meaningful limitation on the rights of publishers to claim copyright. 7 Unoriginal
works, such as white pages listings of telephone directories, may require
substantial time, money and energy to bring into being, and may be eligible for
some protection from unfair competition law.9 However, the Supreme Court
insisted that the Constitution does not permit copyright to be granted in
unoriginal compilations of information."
Since the Feist decision, the U.S. Congress has been asked to create a new form
of copyright-like protection for compilations of information not qualifying for
copyright protection.t "°  Global information industry players, such as Reed
Elsevier, have strongly supported these new rules."' In addition, some digital
media firms have been claiming copyright protection in digitized versions of
public domain works. 2 If public domain works in digital form cannot be fully
" See, e.g., PATrERSON, supra note 22, at 55.
96 The Supreme Court interpreted the U.S. Constitution as requiring "originality" in order for
writings to qualify for federal copyright protection in the Trade-mark Cares, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
9' See Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
9 Id at 354; see also Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997).
" See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Cop3yght and Llation: The Kastenmeier Years, 55 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 79, 88 (1992) (pointing out that the Supreme Court invoked the Constitution thirteen times
in its Feist decision). The Court also relied heavily on L Ray Patterson & CraigJoyce, Monopoling
the Law: The Scope of Copyright Prtectionfor Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 U CLA L REV. 719
(1989), in support of its conclusion that the Constitution limits Congressional power to protect
unoriginal compilations through copyright.
'00 H.R. 354,106th Cong. I st Sess. 1999. See, e.g.,J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997) (explaining genesis of this legislation); J.H.
Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroad: Recent Developments and Their Impact on
Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793 (1999) (analyzing EU-style database bill
introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives).
1o' See, e.g., Laura D'Andrea Tyson & Edward F. Sherry, Statutoy Protectionfor Databases: Economic
and Polt" Issues (1996), submitted on behalf of the Information Industry Association to the House
Judiciary Committee, available at http://www.house.gov/udiciary/41118.htm. Footnote 1 of the
Tyson-Sherry report indicates that Reed-Elsevier, Inc. and The Thomson Corp., both major
international publishing companies, provided funding for that report.
102 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Oiinalio Standard ForLiteray Works Under U.S. Copyright Law,
42 AM.J. COMP. L 393 (1994) (discussing such daims).
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controlled by copyright because of lingering questions about their originality, one
can expect firms that want to control them to use technical protection measures
to control access to and use of these works and/or to obtain intellectual property-
like protection through mass-market licenses governed by the law of jurisdictions
that have adopted the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(formerly known as Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code).' 3
H. UNCLEAR ORIGIN OF RIGHiS
In the modem era, publicly disseminated intellectual creations or informational
works were deemed to be in the public domain unless they qualified for copyright
or patent protection."° In the post-modern, as in the pre-modern era, there is
noticeable fuzziness about the source of authority firms have when claiming rights
in informational works. It is unclear, for example, whether asserted rights to
license works or to technically protect them derive from ownership, from
possession of a particular artifact, from intellectual property law, or from some
other source. In the pre-modem era, the English stationers considered rights in
their "copie" to derive from their possession of manuscripts and any investments
they made in printing the manuscripts. ' In the post-modem era, claims of
seemingly absolute rights to license works on all but unconscionable terms and
to use DRM technologies to control access to protected works have an unclear
provenance. Jessica Litman has pointed out that UCITA posits the existence of
property rights in information other than those arising from intellectual property
law without specifying exactly what those rights are or how far they extend."°6
I. PRIVATE ORDERING AND ENFORCEMENT
Copyright in the pre-modem era was largely a private ordering and enforce-
ment system devised by-the Stationers. In the modem era, copyright has largely
been a creature of positive law and enforcement has largely been handled through
03 This model law is discussed at length in two law review symposium issues. See, e.g.,
Symposium, Intelkctual Propet"y and Contract Law in the Information Age: The IOpact of Artile 2B of the
Unifom ComnrcrialCode on the Future ofTransactionsin Information andElectronic Commerce, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 809 (1998); Symposium, Intellectual Property and Contract Law in the Information Age: The
Impact ofArtick 2B ofthe Uniform CommerialCode on the Future of Transactions in Information and Electronic
Commerce, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1999). UCITA has thus far been enacted in Virginia and Maryland.
See UCITA Online, What's Happening to UCITA in the States, available at http://www.ucitaonline.
com/whathap.html.
104 See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-40; Graham v. John Deere & Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966).
S0 e spra notes 25-28.
'o SeeJessica Litman, The Tales That Ari 2B Tels, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 931 (1998).
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the courts. In the post-modem copyright era, private ordering and enforcement
are becoming more significant. Increasingly, copyright industries are using mass-
market licenses and DRM technologies to override statutory rights of users,
justifying this as a manifestation of freedom of contract principles. 7 Copyright
owners insist that they should not be forced to "sell" copies of their works if they
prefer to "license" them."8 When users pay for computer information, they do
not, in fact, buy a product (e.g., software), but rather acquire a license that informs
them what they can and cannot do with the information they have purchased."19
The copyright rhetoric of justification of this new private ordering resembles the
freedom of contract rhetoric once employed in the now discredited Supreme
Court Lochner decision that struck down public policy limitations on freedom of
contract."' As in the pre-modern era, copyright industry groups in the post-
modem era are playing significant roles in policing compliance with copyright
norms.
1
'
With coordination among industry players, private ordering in copyright
markets can have the same effect as public legislation. An example is the
successful effort of the motion picture industry to persuade the consumer
electronics industry to agree to install an access-, use-, and copy-control
technology, the Content Scramble System (CSS), in all DVD players.' 2
Consumers benefit because there is an industry standard so that any DVD movie
distributed in the U.S. is playable on any DVD player made in the U.S." 3
However, consumers cannot make fair uses of DVD movies because CSS makes
107 See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual
Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 878-79 (1998) (explaining hesitation in overriding
contracts).
... See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product: Comments on the Promise ofArdice
2BforSoftware andInformation Licensing 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 891 (1998) (reviewing licensing rights
under Article 2B).
119 Id at 902.
110 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic OrthodoV of 'Rights
Management" 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998) (explaining scholarly views about intellectual property law
and public policy).
.. The Software Publishers Association, for example, has established a "hotline" through which
disgruntled employees (and others) are able to provide information on their firms regarding
unlicensed software. See, e.g., Technical Institte Settles Software Regarding Copyright Infnngement Suit with
Software PubishersAssodation, athttp://softwaremetering.com/fines/fined7.html (detailing a college
settlement for infringement).
11 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering,
111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1632 (2002) (explaining the content scramble system).
113 See DVD Frequent4 Asked Questions and Answers sec. 1.10, available at http://www.
dvddemystified.com/dvdfaq.html (region coding limits which DVDs can be played on which
players).
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this impossible (without use of a technical countermeasure to bypass CSS)." 4
Because of this inter-industry consortium, the motion picture industry did not
need to ask Congress to require CSS to be installed in every DVD player. It
simply made a private agreement with the consumer electronics industry to
achieve this goal.
Major copyright industries sometimes also seek legislative help to strengthen
their ability to engage in private enforcement activities. A notable example is a
proposal supported by the "major labels" of the recording industry to grant this
industry immunity from civil and criminal liability for "disabling, interfering with,
blocking, diverting, or otherwise impairing" the computer system of any users
whom these copyright owners believe to be infringing copyrights through a peer-
to-peer file sharing system."' The motion picture industry has also tried to
persuade Congress to mandate standard DRM technologies in all digital media
devices in order to strengthen copyright protection and forbid "unfair competi-
tion" by firms willing to make technologies lacking standard DRM."6
In considering the implications of private ordering and enforcement of
copyright, it is worth reflecting on the stationers' copyright system. The history
of this regime suggests that leaving control of informational works solely to
private ordering can have deleterious consequences for society, particularly for
innovation, competition, freedom of expression, and the dissemination of
learning.1
7
J. THE RHETORIC OF "PIRACY" AND "BURGLARY'
Characterizing unauthorized copying as "piracy" has both pre- and post-
modern roots. In the pre-modem era, the so-called "pirates" were printers who
did not belong to the Stationers' Company but dared to publish works in which
members of the Stationers' Company claimed copyright.' Today "pirates" seem
to come in many shapes and sizes. Increasingly common is use of the term
"14 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FuTURE OF IDEAS 189 (2001).
"15 H.R. 5211, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002).
116 S. 2048, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002). See Testimony of Michael Eisner, Hearing Before the
Senate Commerce Committee on S. 2048, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 28, 2002.
I17 See supLra notes 28-48 and accompanying text. It is worth mentioning that to the extent rights
holders adopt DRM technologies to protect digital content and monitor use by individual users, see,
e.g., Cohen, supra note 19, DRM surveillance technologies may provide an infrastructure through
which the government could also engage in monitoring of information uses and in censorship (e.g.,
disabling uses of the content deemed socially harmful). Lessig has warned that some commercial
and governmental entities may have a mutual interest in architectures of control as compared with
architectures of freedom. See, e.g., LESSIG, .upra note 114, Ch. 10-11.
118 See, e.g., ROSE, spra note 22, at 69-71, 74-78.
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"piracy" to refer to single acts of infringement by individuals." 9 Major firms in
post-modem copyright industries are using, or planning to use, technical
protection systems to protect their works from such "piracy."'" These firms are
unwilling to rely solely on private ordering to protect their interests, however. In
1998, they persuaded Congress to make it illegal to bypass a technical protection
measure used by copyright owners to control access to their works and to make
or distribute technologies that can be used to bypass technical access- or use-
controls.' They liken circumvention to "burglary" and the technologies that
enable circumvention to "burglar's tools."' " The anti-circumvention provisions
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), while ambiguous in some key
respects, provide legal reinforcement for technical protection of rights, with
criminal penalties available to punish willful violators of these norms."
K. ENHANCED CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
The rhetoric of piracy lends itself to increased use of criminal penalties to
enforce copyright interests. For the first hundred years of modem copyright law
in the U.S., there were no criminal penalties for copyright infringement.'2 4 For
the second hundred years, copyright infringement was only criminally punishable
if done willfully for profit or private financial gain."2 Post-modem copyright, like
pre-modem copyright, increasingly looks to criminal sanctions to punish "bad"
actors in the copyright space. In the post-modem era, criminal copyright liability
provisions are proliferating and casting a far wider net. The No Electronic Theft
Act of 1997, for example, imposes criminal liability on individual infringers
119 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 349 (2002).
120 See, e.g., Mark Stefik, Shifiing the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Dgital Propeny Rights Chalknge
Us To Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137 (1997) (discussing the concept of
trusted system technology as a means of protecting copyrighted works in digital form).
121 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304,112 Stat. 2860 (1998). The anti-
circumvention provisions are now codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201. These rules resemble the pre-
modem Licensing Acts by requiring that permission be sought before attempts are made to analyze
a technical protection scheme used by copyright owners to protect their works. See id % 1201(g),
12016).
" See, e.g., Testimony of Allan Adler, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 2281,105th Cong., 1 st Sess., Sept.
17, 1997.
'23 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201, 1204. For history of this provision and an analysis of many of its
ambiguities, see, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Propety and the Digital Econoo: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need To Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 519 (1999).
124 See, e.g., Lydia Loren, DigitakZation, Commodhfication, and CnminaiZation: The Evolution of Criminal
Copyight Infringement and The Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 835,840 (1999).
125 Id at 841.
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without regard to profit-making motives."6 The recording industry has recently
urged the Department of Justice to use the NET Act to indict persons who
engage in peer-to-peer file-sharing."V The anti-circumvention provisions of the
DMCA seemingly allow anyone who circumvents an access control or who makes
or provides a circumvention technology to be held criminally liable, even absent
proof of any underlying acts of infringement.' Under this law, a Russian
cryptographer was arrested at a conference in Las Vegas for violating the DMCA
because he developed a program in Russia (a program that was lawful in his home
country) that bypassed Adobe's e-book DRM technology.'"
IV. STRATEGIES FOR COUNTERING POST-MODERN COPYRIGHT
The post-modem era is, of course, distinguishable from the pre-modem era
of copyright in a great many respects, including the social, political, and economic
context within which post-modem developments are occurring. Some members
of the judiciary, including some members of the Supreme Court, continue to
believe in modem copyright precepts."3 In view of this, it would be unduly
alarmist to suggest that post-modernism has totally captured copyright law or that
copyright law will soon divorce itself from freedom of expression principles.
What may save modem copyright from doom may well be this larger context,
including the open architecture of the Intemet, which allows virtually everyone
to become a publisher, and the proliferation of information technologies with
which to make new works and share information.'3' Yet, it would be naive not
" No Electronic Theft Act, 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2000).
127 See, e.g., Declan McCullagh,Fik-SwappingFoesExetP2PPressure, CNET News, athttp://www.
news.com.com/2100-1023-949533.html (Aug. 13, 2002). Several prominent Senators and
Representatives signed a letter to the Justice Department recommending criminal charges against
peer-to-peer file-sharers and makers of file-sharing technologies, avilableathttp://www.politechbot.
com/docs/congress/p2p.letter.081002.pdf.
128 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001) (liability for
violating the anti-trafficking provisions of DMCA anti-circumvention provisions does not depend
on proof--or absence thereof--of infringements arising from the availability of a circumvention
technology). See also 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (criminal liability provision).
'1 See, e.g., United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (discussing
development of program to bypass this e-book reader).
130 See, e.g., Feist Pub. Co. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340,359-60 (1991) (creativity-
based originality standard, not "sweat of the brow," is necessary for copyright protection); Sega Ent.
Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510,1521-22 (9th Cir. 1993) (broadly interpreting fair use doctrine).
See alro Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 801-14 (dissents of Justices Breyer and Stevens).
131 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 114, at 4-16 (discussing the freedom of expression values associated
with the Internet and how and why they are under siege by commercial forces, such as the interests
of copyright owners in controlling the production of information artifacts).
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to notice the drift toward a renewed flirtation with pre-modem concepts and do
nothing to arrest it.
Among the strategic efforts needed to prevent post-modem developments are,
first; a renewed and refreshed discourse about "modem" copyright concepts, such
as fair use, and second, an elucidation of norms and principles for defending
modem copyright from post-modem incursions. Proponents of "modern"
copyright principles have sought to do this in amicus briefs in prominent cases
such as A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.'32 and Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley.' In the Napster case, for example, amici criticized the trial court's
interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.'34 and the breadth of the preliminary injunction that, in essence, would
have required Napster to prove that every digital music file exchanged with aid of
its peer-to-peer software was a noninfringing copy."' In Corley, amici questioned
the application of the DMCA's anti-circumvention rules to a journalist who linked
to sites where a decryption program could be found in the course of news
coverage about a controversy about the program, as well as challenging the
constitutionality of these rules insofar as they eliminate fair use for technically
protected works.136
Also important is principled opposition to post-modem legislative proposals,
such as database protection legislation and UCITA. So far, Congress has resisted
proposals for EU-style database legislation.'37 But database protection legislation
and UCITA have powerful allies who are intent on persuading legislators that
these laws are necessary. UCITA works off the base of copyright, finding in it
"informational rights" that then can be licensed under its aegis.' But UCITA
seems to treat copyright limitations as presumptively precatory and susceptible to
being overridden by license terms.'39 In response to strong criticism of UCITA
132 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affdinpart, rw'd inpart, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
133 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affidsub nora. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273
F.3d 429 (2d Cit. 2001).
1-4 464U.S. 417 (1984) (holding Sony not liable for contributory infringement for sellingBetamax
video tape machine because of substantial noninfringing uses of Betamaxes, including home taping
of television programs for time shifting purposes).
135 Brief Amicus Curiae of Copyright Professors, on appeal to Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (2000) (on file with the author).
136 Brief Amicus Curiae of American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Reversal, on appeal to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley (2001) (on file with the
author) (cited hereinafter as "ACLU Amicus in Corley").
137 See, e.g.,Jonathan C. Band & Makoto Kono, The Database Protection Debate in the 106th Congess,
62 OHio ST. L.J. 869, 871-76 (2001).
138 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors as 'Eicensors" of '1nformational Rights" Under U.C.C. Artile
2B, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945, 947-49 (1998).
139 See, e.g., Charles R. McManis, The Ptivatitation (of "Shtinkw-rapping'" ofAmerian Copri.ght Law,
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from intellectual property law experts, the drafters of UCITA have somewhat
lessened this presumption.'4 UCITA now expressly empowers courts to
withhold enforcement of contract clauses that violate "fundamental public
policy." '141 However, this limitation on licensor authority may give little comfort
to persons whose licenses include a term that limits free expression or fair use
rights. Computer scientists, for example, may be deterred from posting on the
Internet the results of performance tests run on database programs if the license
prohibits public dissemination of test results."' Even if these scientists are
convinced that public policies favoring the free exchange ofideas and information
are fundamental enough to make such clauses unenforceable, they may still not
be keen to invite litigation to challenge these restrictions. A chilling effect may
accordingly set in.
Also troublesome in mass-market licenses are clauses aimed at maintaining
trade secrecy-like limitations on the use of licensed information.'4 3 Such terms
may include prohibitions on reverse-engineering, pledges not to disclose
information, or assertions of the unpublished (and presumably secret) nature of
that information. Such terms may be unobjectionable in some situations (e.g.,
when the result of negotiated licenses between sophisticated commercial firms
possessing relatively equal bargaining power).'" However, they become
disturbing if the licensed work has been the subject of a mass-market transaction.
Even though reverse-engineering object code may be lawful as a matter of
copyright law,'45 license restrictions may attempt to override this copyright-based
privilege.'46 It remains to be seen whether anti-criticism/anti-reverse engineering
87 CAL. L. REV. 173 (1999).
"4 See, e.g., David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17
(1999).
141 UCITA § 105 (1999).
142 Amendments to UCITA were proposed in July 2002 to respond to concerns about anti-
reverse engineering and anti-disclosure of flaws provisions in mass market licenses. See UCITA,
Section 105 (c) and 118, availabk at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bU/ulc/ucita/UCITA-Amds-
AM02.htm. However, even with these amendments, there is still opposition to UCITA. See, e.g.,
Sandeep Junnarkar, UCITA: Why Software Users Will Lose, CNET News.com, Oct. 17, 2002,
available at http://news.com.com/2008-1082-962353.html.
t4 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Sbrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239
(1995) (questioning the enforceability of such licenses).
" See, e.g., Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Bounday Between Copyright and Contract- Copyright
Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DuKE L.J. 479 (1995).
'"s See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (C.A. 9 (Ca.) 1992) (making
incidental copies of a computer program in the course of reverse engineering for purposes of
achieving interoperability held to be fair use).
' See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption. The Law and Poky of Intellectual Propern Licensing,
87 CAL. L. REv. 111 (1999).
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clauses will proliferate and how courts will deal with them.'47 But it is clear that
UCITA licenses may enable acts of private censorship that copyright and freedom
of expression principles, left to their own devices, would disfavor.
Another initiative needed to counter post-modem trends is to devise limits on
the DMCA anti-circumvention rules, which make it illegal to circumvent a
technical protection system used by a copyright owner to control access to its
work 4 ' and to make or distribute technologies that circumvent access controls or
other technical measures used by copyright owners. 49 That these rules can
undermine freedom of speech and freedom of expression values is evident from
a lawsuit initiated by major movie studios against a journalist named Corley for
violating the anti-circumvention rules when he posted a computer program
known as DeCSS on the website of 2600 magazine in the course of covering the
controversy about this program. DeCSS can be used to bypass the Content
Scrambling System (CSS) embedded in mass-marketed DVD movies. Corley was
enjoined both from posting DeCSS on the 2600 website and linking to sites where
DeCSS had been posted.1"' This is remarkable in part because the studios offered
no proof that DeCSS had ever been used to make a single infringing copy of a
DVD movie; indeed, the plaintiffs stipulated that they had no such proof'
If Corley can be enjoined from linking to sites where allegedly illegal
information can be found, then so too can the San Jose Mercury News, and so
can Professor Jane Ginsburg. Ginsburg had linked to sites where DeCSS could
be found so that students enrolled in her copyright course could better under-
stand the controversy about this program and analyze the application of the
DMCA to it."3 Since Corley enjoined the posting of both source and object code
forms of DeCSS, it would seem that those who wear T-shirts bearing DeCSS
source code, or those researchers who provide information about various ways
to descramble CSS on the web, would be equally vulnerable to liability under the
147 Vault v. .Quaidexemplifies the modem approach to anti-reverse engineering clauses in mass-
market licenses. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (deciding not
to enforce an anti-reverse engineering clause of shrink-wrap license under state law because doing
so would conflict with federal copyright policy). For a post-modem expression of willingness to
enforce anti-reverse engineering clauses, see Bowers v. Baystate Tech., Inc., 2003 WL 262300 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (enforcing an anti-reverse engineering clause of a shrink-wrap license for software).
148 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000).
149 Id § 1201(a)(2). See also id § 1201(b)(1) (2000) (banning other kinds of circumvention
technologies).
150 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429,439 (2d Cir. 2001).
's' Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,312,341 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd
sub nor. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
152 Id at 314-15.
153 See, e.g.,Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use andExcuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS
1, 10-21 (2000) (discussing fair use and free speech issues raised by linking).
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analysis in Cory.'s' In the post-modem era, free speech and fair use may become
subsidiary values to the overriding importance of protecting the business models
and technologies that copyright owners adopt for their works. 5
The DMCA rules can and should be limited in scope. For one thing, textual
explanations of weaknesses of DRM technologies or Intemet posting of source
code for communicative purposes should be construed as outside the DMCA
anti-circumvention rules. This would protect the right of researchers, such as
Edward Felten and his colleagues and students to present papers at scientific
conferences on deficiencies in digital watermarking technologies," 6 and David
Touretzky to maintain his "[gallery of CSS [d]escramblers."'' 7  The U.S.
Department ofJustice suggested a second limiting principle in its brief supporting
a motion to dismiss a declaratory judgment action brought by Edward Felten
against the Recording Industry Association of America. In the Department's
view, Felten did not violate the DMCA when doing research on flaws in digital
watermarking technologies and writing a paper about the flaws because Felten's
primary goal was to assist in development of more secure systems, not to
circumvent them.' Representative Rick Boucher has recommended amend-
ments to the DMCA anti-circumvention rules that, among other things, would
limit the anti-tool rules so that scientific researchers such as Felten will be free of
fear of DMCA charges." 9 A third limiting principle is that those who make anti-
competitive claims under the DMCA (e.g., to exclude competitors from the
market or to control the market for complementary products) should be deemed
's See Farhad Manjoo, Court to Address DeCSS T-Shirt, WIRED NEWS, Aug. 2, 2000, available at
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/O,1282,37941,00.htnl.
155 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. McLaughlin, 2000 WL 48512 at 2-3 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2000)
(articulating the need for trade secret law to protect plaintiff's secrets that had been incorporated in
another program and then posted by Bunner and McLaughlin on the Internet). This decision was
reversed sub nomine DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 60 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1803 (Cal. App. 6th Dist.) (2001). The California Supreme Court will hear DVD CCA's
appeal of the Court of Appeals ruling. See DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 41 P.3d 2 (Cal.
2002).
156 See, e~g., Scott A. Craver et al., Reating Between the Lines: Iessons from the SDMI Challenge (Aug.
2000), availabk at http://www.usenix.org/events/secO1/cravrer.pdf. See also Pamela Samuelson,
Anti-Cirrumvention Rules: Threatnto Sdence, 293 SCIENCE 2028 (Sept. 14,2001), available athttp://www.
sims.berkeley.edu/-pam/papers.html.
's See, e.g., Gaga of CSS Descramblers, at http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/-dst/DeCSS/Gallery/.
See, e.g., Reply Brief of the U.S. Dept. of Justice in Support of Motion to Dismiss Felten v.
RIAA in the U.S. District Court in the District of NewJersey, Nov. 8,2001, availabk athttp://www.
eff.org/Legal/Cases/Felten-vRIAA/20011108-doj-reply-brief.htmnl (stating that Felten did not
violate the DMCA anti-circumvention rules because he was trying to strengthen technical protection
measures).
19 See, e.g., H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
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guilty of misuse of the DMCA.'" Fourth, courts should read broadly two
subsections of the DMCA by which Congress sought to ensure that the anti-
circumvention rules would not diminish fair use or free speech rights. 6' The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals essentially construed these provisions out of the
statute,1 62 but other courts may breathe life into these limits on the reach of the
anti-circumvention rules. 63 Finally, the Constitution may well need to be invoked
to limit the reach of the anti-circumvention rules."6 After all, these rules grant
perpetual exclusive rights with no showing of original authorship or invention and
undermine disclosure of information, a value long recognized as a "quid pro quo"
of the grant of intellectual property rights.
16
V. CONCLUSION
For copyright law to remain true to the modem tradition of co-existing
harmoniously with freedom of expression principles, those who cherish this
heritage must be steadfast in monitoring the evolution of copyright and related
policies and practices in the commercial market. Post-modernism has made
considerable headway. However, the struggle is far from over. The ground-
breaking work of L. Ray Patterson has shown how indifferent, if not hostile, the
pre-modem copyright system was toward freedom of expression values. 66 Post-
modem developments evince similar worrisome tendencies.
Copyright's past will unquestionably be a prologue to its future. The principal
question is whether modem copyright principles will predominate or whether the
law will evolve further toward postmodern structures and practices which pose
dangers for free expression values similar to those of the pre-modem copyright
regime. Decisions about how copyright rules should be configured will have
profound consequences for the evolution of the information society in the
110 Dan L. Burk, DMCA Misuse, 47 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). An example of DMCA
misuse is the claim made by a computer printer firm Lexmark against a competitor that sells
replacement toner cartridges that bypass an access control measure that Lexmark installed in its
printers. For a discussion of the anti-competitive consequences of a ruling in Lexmark's favor, see,
e.g., Henry Norr, Suit May Lead to SpplmsShotage, S.F. CHRONICLE, Feb. 10, 2003, at E-1.
161 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1), (c)(4) (2002). See also Benkler, supra note 19, at 414-29 (discussing
first amendment implications of the anti-circumvention regulations).
162 Corlr, 273 F.3d at 443-44.
16 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Econooj: IWhy the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to BeRetised, 14 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 519 (1999) (suggesting strategies
for limiting constructions of the DMCA rules).
16 See, e.g., ACLU Amicus in Corley, supra note 136 (arguing that without limiting principles such
as fair use, the DMCA is unconstitutional).
165 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 787 (2003) (citing cases).
"6 See, e.g., PATrERSON, supra note 22, at 114-42.
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twenty-first century. The optimal choice, in my view, would be to retain the
modem concept of copyright and reject postmodern tendencies. To achieve this
goal, believers in the modern concept of copyright must work together to develop
a more powerful rhetoric with which to preserve constitutionally grounded values
in copyright law and policy. Rhetoric alone, however, will not suffice.
Policymakers must also receive guidance about how these values can be
specifically implemented in copyright rules that will truly "promote the progress
of science and the useful arts" and preserve an open and democratic society. 6
167 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869 (1996)
(suggesting ways to translate constitutional values into the new information policy environment).
See also LESSIG,.supra note 19, at ch. 11 (translating constitutional values specifically as to copyright).
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